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The Spending Power and the
Federalist Revival
Lynn A. Baker*
INTRODUCTION
Amid all the attention afforded the Court’s recent federalism
decisions, one important fact has gone largely unnoticed:1  The
greatest threat to state autonomy is, and has long been, Con-
gress’s spending power.2  No matter how narrowly the Court
might read Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause3 and
* Thomas Watt Gregory Professor, University of Texas School of Law.
<lbaker@mail.law.utexas.edu>  This Article was prepared for a symposium on “The Spend-
ing Clause: Enumerated Power or Blank Check?,” held at the Chapman University School
of Law on January 19, 2001.
My thanks to Professor John Eastman for inviting me to participate, to the Chapman
faculty and students for their gracious hospitality, and to the conference panelists and par-
ticipants for a day of stimulating intellectual exchange.  I am grateful to the Editors of the
Chapman Law Review, especially Richard Tilley and Yvonne Dalton, for their hard work
and good cheer throughout the editorial process.  University of Texas Law Librarian, Keith
Stiverson, went well beyond the call of duty in expeditiously locating various source materi-
als.  An earlier version of portions of this Article was presented at the Annual Meeting of
the American Political Science Association, Cornell Law School, the University of Iowa Col-
lege of Law, the University of Virginia School of Law, and the Vanderbilt University Law
School; I am grateful for the helpful comments received on each of those occasions.
Special thanks to Sam Dinkin, Ph.D., for assistance both with statistical analysis and
with our two-year-old daughter, Mahria.
1 The few exceptions include Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lo-
pez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1920 (1995) (“[I]f the Spending Clause is simultaneously in-
terpreted to permit Congress to seek otherwise forbidden regulatory aims indirectly
through a conditional offer of federal funds to the states, the notion of  ‘a federal govern-
ment of enumerated powers’ will have no meaning.”) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Baker,
Conditional Federal Spending]; Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir.
2000) (en banc) (Bowman, J., dissenting) (quoting Baker, supra, approvingly); South Da-
kota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 217 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“If the spending power is
to be limited only by Congress’ notion of the general welfare, the reality, given the vast
financial resources of the Federal Government, is that the Spending Clause gives ‘power to
the Congress to tear down the barriers, to invade the states’ jurisdiction, and to become a
parliament of the whole people, subject to no restrictions save such as are self-imposed.’
This, of course, . . . was not the Framers’ plan and it is not the meaning of the Spending
Clause.”) (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936) (citation omitted)).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . .”).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause);  United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked authority under the
Commerce Clause to enact civil remedy provision of Violence Against Women Act). Cf.
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 121 S.Ct. 675, 683
(2001) (observing that twice in the past six years the Court has “reaffirmed the proposition
195
\\Server03\productn\C\CHP\4-1\CHP106.txt unknown Seq: 2 23-APR-01 17:19
196 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 4:195
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,4 and no matter how abso-
lute a prohibition the Court might impose on Congress’s “comman-
deering” of state and local officials,5 the states will be at the mercy
of Congress so long as there are no meaningful limits on its spend-
ing power.6
The Framers did not intend for Congress to have a near ple-
nary power of the purse.7  As written, the Spending Clause limits
that the grant of authority to Congress under the Commerce Clause, though broad, is not
unlimited”).
4 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 exceeded Congress’s enforcement powers under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (holding that civil remedy provi-
sion of Violence Against Women Act exceeded Congress’s enforcement powers under section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, __
U.S. __, 2001 WL 173556 (2001) (holding that provision of Americans with Disabilities Act
authorizing individuals to sue a State for money damages in federal court exceeded Con-
gress’s enforcement powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and is not a
valid abrogation of the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity).
5 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the “take
title” provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1985 exceeded Congress’s
enumerated powers and violated the Tenth Amendment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898 (1997) (holding that the obligation on state law enforcement officers under the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act to conduct background checks on prospective handgun
purchasers unconstitutionally required state officers to execute federal laws). But see Reno
v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000) (unanimously holding that Driver’s Privacy Protection
Act of 1994, regulating the disclosure of personal information contained in the records of
state motor vehicle departments, did not “violate the principles laid down in either New
York or Printz”).
6 Today, the major constitutional constraint on Congress’s spending power is the Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105
(1968) (holding that “the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does specifically
limit the taxing and spending power conferred by Art. I, § 8”).  In addition, the Constitu-
tion’s other protections for individual rights could be viewed as incidental constraints on
the spending power insofar as some laws held to violate those provisions of the Constitu-
tion might involve the expenditure of federal funds.  For the purposes of this article, it is
significant that all of these constraints are aimed at protecting individuals rather than the
states and could therefore be expected to be of little use in protecting the states against
federal expenditures they find problematic.
7 See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 77 (1936) (“Hamilton himself, the
leading advocate of broad interpretation of the power to tax and to appropriate for the
general welfare, never suggested that any power granted by the Constitution could be used
for the destruction of local self-government in the states.  Story countenances no such doc-
trine.  It seems never to have occurred to them . . . that the general welfare of the United
States, (which has aptly been termed ‘an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible
States,’) might be served by obliterating the constituent members of the Union.”); South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 217 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“If the spending power is to be
limited only by Congress’ notion of the general welfare, the reality, given the vast financial
resources of the Federal Government, is that the Spending Clause gives ‘power to Congress
to tear down the barriers, to invade the states’ jurisdiction, and to become a parliament of
the whole people, subject to no restrictions save such as are self-imposed.’ . . .  This, of
course, as Butler held, was not the Framers’ plan and it is not the meaning of the Spending
Clause.”) (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 78); John C. Eastman, Restoring the “General” to the
General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 63, 65 (2001) (arguing that historical record shows
that Congress “has only the power to spend for the ‘general’ welfare and not for the special
welfare of particular regions or states, even if the spending was undertaken in all regions
or all states and therefore might be said to enhance ‘general’ welfare in the aggregate”); cf.
David E. Engdahl, The Basis of the Spending Power, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 215, 243 (1995)
(concluding from historical record that “the ‘general Welfare’ phrase in the Taxing Clause
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Congress’s expenditures to providing “for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States.”8  Since 1936, however,
the Supreme Court has held this limitation to be effectively non-
justiciable and, with few exceptions, has historically declined to
review Congress’s spending decisions.9  In addition, since 1923 the
Court has crafted standing doctrine to severely restrict the ability
of taxpayers to challenge Congress’s spending decisions in any fed-
eral court.10
of the Constitution alludes to the vast generality of purposes to which tax revenues, as well
as other federal receipts, might be put, but does nothing to empower Congress to spend”).
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
9 In United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), the Court described the standard of
review under the Spending Clause as follows:
When such a contention [that a law fails to conform to the limits set upon the use
of a granted power] comes here we naturally require a showing that by no reasona-
ble possibility can the challenged legislation fall within the wide range of discre-
tion permitted to the Congress. How great is the extent of that range, when the
subject is the promotion of the general welfare of the United States, we need hardly
remark.  But, despite the breadth of the legislative discretion, our duty to hear and
to render judgment remains.
Id. at 67 (emphasis added).  The following year, in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937),
the Court reiterated the “no reasonable possibility” standard first articulated in Butler, see
id. at 641, and added that the discretion afforded by the “general welfare” language of the
Spending Clause “belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbi-
trary power, not an exercise of judgment.” Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
By 1976, the Court was willing to state that it considered the “general welfare” lan-
guage to provide no constraint at all on Congress’s spending power:
Appellants’ “general welfare” contention erroneously treats the General Welfare
Clause as a limitation upon congressional power.  It is rather a grant of power, the
scope of which is quite expansive, particularly in view of the enlargement of power
by the Necessary and Proper Clause . . . .  It is for Congress to decide which ex-
penditures will promote the general welfare: “[T]he power of Congress to authorize
expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct
grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.” . . .  Any limitations upon
the exercise of that granted power must be found elsewhere in the Constitution
. . . .  Whether the chosen means appear “bad,” “unwise,” or “unworkable” to us is
irrelevant; Congress has concluded that the means are “necessary and proper” to
promote the general welfare, and we thus decline to find this legislation without
the grant of power in Art. I, § 8.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976) (per curiam).  Finally, in South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203 (1987), the Court observed that the level of judicial deference required under
the Spending Clause was so great that it “questioned whether ‘general welfare’ is a judi-
cially enforceable restriction at all.” Id. at 207 n.2.
10 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923) (holding a federal tax-
payer to be without standing to enjoin the execution of a federal appropriation act, and
observing that the “right of a taxpayer to enjoin the execution of a federal appropriation
act, on the ground that it is invalid and will result in taxation for illegal purposes, has
never been passed upon by this Court”); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (same;
consolidated action); Asarco Inc., v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989) (“As an ordinary mat-
ter, suits premised on federal taxpayer status are not cognizable in the federal courts. . .”).
But see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85 (1968) (describing Frothingham as standing for
45 years as “an impenetrable barrier to suits against Acts of Congress brought by individu-
als who can assert only the interest of federal taxpayers,” and holding that “the Frothing-
ham barrier should be lowered when a taxpayer attacks a federal statute on the ground
that it violates the Establishment [Clause]”). See also Richard Epstein, Standing and
Spending—The Role of Legal and Equitable Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REV 1, 4 (2001) (contend-
ing, inter alia, that “doctrine of standing in American constitutional law was crafted by the
progressives who were anxious to insure that their political initiatives . . . could be shielded
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Today, Congress’s largely unfettered spending power under-
mines the Constitution’s protections for state autonomy and
reduces aggregate social welfare in two major ways:  through sys-
tematic fiscal redistribution among the states11 and conditional
federal spending.12  This Article examines this important and
long-standing, if largely undiscussed, problem.  I conclude that
state autonomy cannot be protected in this context through either
of the means most frequently proposed:  the inherent protections
of the federal lawmaking process or the process of constitutional
amendment.  Thus, the only viable protection lies in judicial re-
view under the existing Spending Clause.  The interesting ques-
tion then becomes why the modern Court has so steadfastly
refused to play any role in this area.
Part I explains how the modern Congress regularly uses fiscal
redistribution among the states and conditional federal spending
to impinge, intentionally or unintentionally, on the autonomy that
the Framers sought to guarantee the states.  This Part also ex-
plains how and why these intrusions on state autonomy reduce
aggregate social welfare.  Thus one need not subscribe either to
“originalist” schools of constitutional interpretation or to my read-
ing of the Framers’ intent in this context in order to find the ex-
isting state of affairs unsatisfactory.  One need only be persuaded
that a reduction in aggregate social welfare is both likely and
problematic.
Part II examines two commonly invoked means of limiting
congressional power in the area of states’ rights and argues, con-
trary to the existing commentary, that neither of them can be suc-
cessful in this context.  I show, first, that the states cannot protect
themselves through the federal political process against Con-
gress’s exercise of its spending power, notwithstanding the fact
that Congress is comprised of representatives of the states.  Sec-
ond, I demonstrate that an amendment to enhance the existing,
unenforced constitutional constraints on Congress’s spending
from judicial attack”). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public
Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1434-36 (1988) (describing evolution of standing doctrine as
an attempt to restore common law entitlements of Lochner era); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s
Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163,
178-197 (1992) (tracing history of standing).
11 In previous articles, I have discussed the role of the United States Senate in ensur-
ing unjustifiable, systematic redistribution among the states. See Lynn A. Baker & Samuel
H. Dinkin, Getting From Here to There: The Rebirth of Constitutional Constraints on the
Special Interest State, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 515 (1999) [hereinafter Baker & Dinkin,
Rebirth]; Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has
Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL. 21 (1997) [hereinafter Baker & Dinkin, The Senate];  Lynn A. Baker,
Federalism: The Argument from Article V, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 923 (1997).
12 I have discussed the various problems with conditional federal spending in previous
articles. See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending, supra note 1; Lynn A. Baker, R
The Revival of States’ Rights: A Progress Report and a Proposal, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
95 (1998) [hereinafter The Revival of States’ Rights].
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power will never be formally proposed, let alone ratified, because
an identifiable group of states—numerous enough to block the
proposal of such an amendment—systematically and unjustifiably
benefits from the existing regime.
In light of these difficulties constraining Congress’s spending
power through other means, the inexorable conclusion is that any
solution rests with the Courts’ willingness to exercise judicial re-
view under the Spending Clause.  Part III discusses the impor-
tance of judicial review in this area, and concludes with
speculation on why the modern Court nonetheless has so aggres-
sively declined to play any meaningful role in limiting Congress’s
spending power.
I. THE EFFECTS OF THE MODERN CONGRESS’S SPENDING POWER
ON STATE AUTONOMY AND AGGREGATE SOCIAL WELFARE
The modern Congress’s exercise of its spending power regu-
larly impinges in two general ways on the autonomy that the
Framers sought to guarantee the states:  through fiscal redistribu-
tion among the states and conditional federal spending.  In this
Part, I describe each of these intrusions on state autonomy and
explain why each occurs.  I also explain why each type of intrusion
reduces aggregate social welfare.
A. Fiscal Redistribution Among the States
It is well known that the existing structure of representation
in Congress, combined with the existing rules of majoritarian deci-
sion making,13 affords small population states disproportionately
great representation relative to their shares of the nation’s popu-
lation.  It is much less well known that this allocation of represen-
tation significantly affects the distribution of gains from any
legislation Congress enacts under the Spending Clause, ensuring
small population states a disproportionately large slice, and large
population states a disproportionately small slice, of the federal
“pie.”  This systematic wealth redistribution obviously infringes
on the autonomy of the states that are burdened by the redistribu-
tion:  In the absence of such redistribution, the burdened states
would effectively have more money and, therefore, greater free-
dom of choice.  In this section, I explain how and why, in the ab-
sence of any meaningful constitutional constraint, Congress’s
exercise of its spending power can be expected to result in system-
13 Of course, Congress is at present only an imperfectly majoritarian body given the
Senate’s cloture rule, which requires 60 votes to end debate regardless of the number of
Senators present. See Baker & Dinkin, The Senate, supra note 11, at 29 n.28, 61. See R
generally SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE? FILIBUSTERING IN
THE UNITED STATES SENATE (1997); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster,
49 STAN. L. REV. 181 (1997).
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atic wealth redistribution from the larger states to the smaller
states.
Insofar as members of Congress are concerned with re-elec-
tion, and therefore also with the welfare of their constituents, they
will each seek to enact legislation whose expected benefits to his
or her own constituents exceed its expected costs to them.  Moreo-
ver, because legislators themselves are scarce resources and their
choice of agenda necessarily entails opportunity costs,14 their first
priority is likely to be legislation whose expected benefits to their
constituents most greatly exceeds its expected costs to them.
Thus, we would expect each legislator to be especially eager to en-
act “special legislation” whose benefits accrue uniquely to her own
constituents but whose costs are spread among the constituents of
all legislators.  Certainly, each legislator should be relatively more
interested in enacting such special legislation than in seeking leg-
islation whose costs and benefits are both generally distributed or
are both concentrated on her own constituents.15
Unfortunately, special legislation is more likely to be ex-
propriative, that is, to have aggregate costs that exceed its aggre-
gate benefits, than legislation whose costs and benefits are both
generally distributed or both concentrated on the same constitu-
ency.  Each of these latter two types of legislation is likely to be
enacted only if its aggregate benefits exceed its aggregate costs
since no constituency is likely to seek the passage of legislation
whose costs to itself exceed its benefits.  Special legislation, how-
ever, may be enacted even if its aggregate costs exceed its aggre-
gate benefits.  Since vote trading is possible, Legislator A will
often agree to support legislation that yields $10 million in bene-
fits for Legislator’s B constituents even if it imposes aggregate
costs of $11 million on the rest of the nation (including, but not
14 Professors Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus explain “opportunity costs” as
follows:
The immediate dollar cost of going to a movie instead of studying is the price
of a ticket, but the opportunity cost also includes the possibility of getting a higher
grade on the exam.  The opportunity costs of a decision include all its conse-
quences, whether they reflect monetary transactions or not.
Decisions have opportunity costs because choosing one thing in a world of
scarcity means giving up something else.  The opportunity cost is the value of the
good or service forgone.
PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 128 (16th ed. 1998) (emphasis
omitted).
15 Although any legislator’s first preference logically might be to enact special legisla-
tion that uniquely benefits her own constituents and whose costs are borne exclusively by
other legislator’s constituents, such legislation likely will face greater opposition than simi-
lar legislation whose costs are distributed more generally.  This is particularly likely to be
the case if the costs of the legislation are concentrated on another group. See Maxwell L.
Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV.  385, 400-
22 (1992); cf. Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 44 (1983) (“A representative or senator seldom can argue convincingly that he alone
is responsible for the legislative production of a public good . . . .”) (emphasis added).
\\Server03\productn\C\CHP\4-1\CHP106.txt unknown Seq: 7 23-APR-01 17:19
2001] Federalist Revival 201
concentrated on, Legislator A’s constituents).  Legislator A will
support this legislation in exchange for Legislator B’s vote on leg-
islation that similarly benefits Legislator A’s constituents at the
expense of the rest of the nation (including Legislator B’s
constituents).
Notwithstanding the aggregate welfare loss, this type of vote
trading would be attractive to representatives for at least two rea-
sons.  First, the terms of each representative’s trades, taken alone,
might well provide her own constituents aggregate benefits that
exceed the aggregate costs to them.  That is, in order to obtain
support sufficient to enact legislation that provides her constitu-
ents $10 million in special benefits, a representative may need to
support legislation that provides other representative’s constitu-
ents special benefits at an aggregate cost to her own constituents
of only $8 million.  This is possible because the approval of only a
simple majority of legislators is necessary for enactment.  Thus,
the constituents of representatives who were not a party to these
particular bargains, and who may have even opposed the legisla-
tion, will nonetheless bear a portion of its total cost, a portion that
the beneficiaries of the special legislation need not internalize.16
Second, even if the terms of a particular set of trades do not
provide a representatives’ constituents aggregate benefits that ex-
16 In making such bargains, therefore, a representative might logically be expected to
seek the support of the minimum number of representatives necessary to secure passage of
her legislation. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS 32-101 (1962)
(arguing that in American politics, parties seek to increase votes only until they achieve the
minimum necessary to form a winning coalition).  By doing so, a representative simultane-
ously minimizes the amount of strategic bargaining in which she must engage (i.e., the
representative’s opportunity costs), and maximizes the competition among legislators to
join her coalition, thereby driving down the price of obtaining any one legislator’s support.
This in turn minimizes the total amount the representative must “pay” to ensure passage
of her legislation.
In practice, however, proponents of legislation will strive to secure a supermajority of
votes, largely because of the uncertainty under which pre-vote lobbying and logrolling
takes place: the outcome of the final vote cannot be known in advance.  In this context,
political scientist R. Douglas Arnold has observed:
All else equal, [legislative] leaders prefer large coalitions because they provide the
best insurance for the future.  Each proposal must survive a long series of
majoritarian tests—in committees and subcommittees, in House and Senate, and
in authorization, appropriations, and budget bills.  Large majorities help to insure
that a bill clears these hurdles with ease.
R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 117-18 (1990) (emphasis ad-
ded) [hereinafter ARNOLD, LOGIC]; see also R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, CONGRESS AND THE BU-
REAUCRACY: A THEORY OF INFLUENCE 43, 52 (1979) (Legislators seek supermajorities
“because a whole series of majorities are required, one at each stage of the congressional
process . . . . [and] they want to minimize risks of miscalculation or last-minute changes.”)
[hereinafter ARNOLD, THEORY]; DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION
111-15 & n.67 (1974) (frequency distribution data indicate that House and Senate roll call
votes “are bimodal, with a mode in the marginal range (50-59.9 percent) and a mode in the
unanimity or near-unanimity range (90-100 percent)”; similar patterns have been observed
in state legislatures). But see WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS 32-
101 (1962) (arguing that in American politics, parties seek to increase votes only until they
achieve the minimum necessary to form a winning coalition).
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ceed its aggregate costs to them, the representative will be able to
claim complete credit for the special legislation that benefits her
constituents, but will share only diffuse blame for helping enact
special legislation that benefits others at the partial expense of
her own constituents.  Because this blame is diffuse, it will be less
salient to her own constituents and may also be less well publi-
cized than the passage of the beneficial special legislation.  Thus,
the benefits to each representative of this sort of vote trading are
likely to exceed the costs.
This is the tragedy of the legislative commons.17  Although
each representative’s individually rational decision will necessa-
rily contribute to a decline in social welfare, a representative can
only hurt her own constituents (and therefore her own chances for
re-election) if she does not seek special legislation.18  For in a
majoritarian system in which vote trading is possible, a represen-
tative’s constituents nonetheless will bear part of the costs of
other successful bargains resulting in special legislation for other
representatives’ constituents, including bargains to which the rep-
resentative was not a party and which she even may have op-
posed.  Thus, only by joining the race to forge successful bargains
that simultaneously benefit her constituents and exploit those
who are not members of the winning coalition—a true “race to the
bottom”—can an individual legislator maximize her constituents’,
and therefore her own, welfare.19
Of course, legislation must also receive the approval of the
President before it becomes law, and such expropriative legisla-
tion seems a likely target for an executive veto.  Because his con-
stituency is the entire nation, a President might be expected to be
guided by the preferences of a majority of the entire electorate.20
17 Cf. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968); see also
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 139-40 (1962) [hereinafter BUCHANAN & TULLOCK];
Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation and Institutional Design in State and Local Government
Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 625, 645-46 (1994).
18 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 17, at 139-40; Gillette, supra note 17, at 636-38, R
645-46.
19 The “race-to-the-bottom” and the “tragedy of the commons,” whether legislative or
otherwise, are both variants on the Prisoner’s Dilemma. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 17, R
at 638 n.36 (explaining “tragedy of the commons” in terms of the Prisoner’s Dilemma);
Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bot-
tom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1217-19
(1992) (explaining “race-to-the-bottom” in terms of the Prisoner’s Dilemma).
20 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 17, at 248 (“The President should, insofar as he R
uses his veto power as a simple legislative tool, follow the preferences of the majority of the
voters.”); Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better Than One?, 12 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 145, 155 (1992) (“One-quarter of the voters may elect one-half of the legis-
lature, but the [P]resident must still be responsive to a coalition of one-half.”).
This expectation must be modified slightly, however, in light of the fact that the Presi-
dent is not elected directly by the People, but rather by the electoral college which gives
different weights to the votes of residents of different states. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.
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And, notwithstanding its passage by a majoritarian body, special
legislation is unlikely to have the sincere support of a majority of
voters.21  Nonetheless, special legislation is unlikely to be vetoed
for the same sorts of reasons that legislators seek its enactment.
Should he veto such legislation, the President will arouse the in-
tense, well publicized, and not-soon-forgotten ire of the concen-
trated minority that would have benefited from the legislation,
while simultaneously providing a diffuse and scarcely salient ben-
efit to a substantial majority.22  Certainly, the benefits to a Presi-
dent of vetoing such legislation (particularly during his first term)
will seldom exceed the costs.23
Given this analysis, one would expect much of the legislation
that Congress enacts pursuant to its spending power to be special
legislation that reduces aggregate social welfare.  These enact-
ments would not impinge on state autonomy, however, if repre-
sentation of the states in Congress were allocated solely on the
2-3.  By affording each state “a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators
and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress,” U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 1, cl. 2, the Constitution gives the small states a disproportionately greater power to
choose the President, relative to their share of the nation’s population.  Thus, although
California, for example, currently has 69 times the population of Wyoming (33,145,121 ver-
sus 479,602), it has only 18 times as many presidential Electors ((52 Reps. + 2 Senators =
54) versus (1 Rep. + 2 Senators = 3)). See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, 33 THE BOOK OF
THE STATES 464-65 tbl.10.3 (2000-01 ed.) [hereinafter THE BOOK OF THE STATES].
This in turn means that the President, who needs 270 electoral votes in order to be
(re)elected, may formally represent only the 45.4% of the nation’s population that resides in
the 40 smallest states. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 2000, at 23, tbl. 20 (120th ed.) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
21 That is, in a world without vote trading, this legislation would not garner the sup-
port of a majority. Cf. Gillette, supra note 17, at 636-47. R
22 See Glen O. Robinson, Public Choice Speculations on the Item Veto, 74 VA. L. REV.
403, 411-12 (1988) (suggesting this as the reason why one “may doubt that item veto au-
thority would effect a major change in political practice. . .”).  These same incentives nearly
led President Clinton in 1995 to veto the recommendations of an independent commission
on military base closings—a body originally established to avoid the problem of special
legislation—because their recommendation would result in a loss of nearly 20,000 jobs in
California, a state crucial to his re-election. See Tim Weiner, Decrying Base-Closing Plan
as an “Outrage,” the President Gives a Grudging Go-Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1995, at
A16.  Indeed, Clinton ultimately approved the Commission’s recommendations only after
the Commission assured him that the Pentagon would be permitted to turn over most of
the jobs at risk to private contractors. See Eric Schmitt, After Assurances on California
Jobs, Clinton Is Expected to Approve Base-Closing List, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1995, at B9.
23 Buchanan and Tullock do not appear to see this. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra
note 17, at 248 (contending that “the President should, insofar as he uses his veto power as R
a simple legislative tool, follow the preferences of the majority of the voters” and
“[t]herefore, he would accept only bargains which meet the approval of the majority of the
populace. . .”).  Yet this lack of presidential incentive is why Professor Robinson predicts
that “the item veto would be only marginally useful in curtailing private goods [or “special”]
legislation.”  Robinson, supra note 22, at 419-20.  In addition, the President may himself R
have “special political debts to particular groups or geographic regions, and can be expected
to favor special benefits for them” or at least not to veto such benefits. Id. at 412 n.32.
Former President Reagan, for example, did not extend “his general campaign against
wasteful spending to subsidized grazing rights and electric power in the West, his strongest
political base.” Id. (citing Normal Ornstein, Veto the Line Item Veto, FORTUNE, Jan. 7, 1985,
at 109-11).
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basis of population, and each state’s coalition-building power (i.e.,
its power to enact legislation) in Congress were therefore substan-
tially proportional to its share of the nation’s population.  Under a
scheme of proportional representation, one would expect the total
dollar amount of each state’s benefits from all the special legisla-
tion enacted over time to be approximately proportional to its pop-
ulation, and the per capita benefits to each state would therefore
be nearly the same.  Thus, under a scheme of purely proportional
representation, one would not expect Congress’s spending legisla-
tion to reveal systematic fiscal redistribution among the states
with its attendant impingement on the autonomy of the states
that systematically bear the costs of the redistribution.
In fact, of course, the representation of the states in the Sen-
ate is not proportional to their respective populations.  Because
each state receives two representatives, the Senate affords small-
population states (“small” states) disproportionately great repre-
sentation, and large-population states (“large” states) dispropor-
tionately little representation, relative to their shares of the
nation’s population.  This in turn means that the small states
have disproportionately great “coalition-building power” in the
Senate relative to their shares of the nation’s population.
One measure of a state’s theoretical “coalition-building
power” is the likelihood that it will be the swing vote on any pro-
posed legislation.24  In the Senate, each state has the same 2-in-
100 theoretical chance to be the swing vote on a given piece of
proposed legislation.25  In the language of modern game theory,
the Shapley-Shubik power index of every state is equal in the Sen-
ate.26  But this means that smaller states have a disproportion-
24 The notion of the swing voter or “pivot” for the winning coalition is central to both
the Shapley-Shubik power index and the Banzhaf power index. See MARTIN SHUBIK, GAME
THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: CONCEPTS AND SOLUTIONS 200-04 (1982).  I assume
throughout that each state’s representatives vote as a block.  Relaxing this assumption
simplifies the calculations I discuss in this part, but does not change the results.
25 Each Senator has the same 1-in-100 theoretical chance to be the swing vote on any
proposed legislation.  And each of the 50 states is represented by two Senators, each with
one vote. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
26 The Shapley-Shubik index considers all possible orders in which a vote can take
place.  For any ordering of n players (voters) there will be a unique player who is in a
position to provide the winning coalition with just enough strength to win.  That player is
the pivot for the coalition.  If all n! orderings are assumed equiprobable, then the Shapley-
Shubik index is a measure of the probability that any player is pivotal.  If one assumes
instead that every winning coalition is equiprobable, the Banzhaf Index can be used to
measure the probability that any one player (voter) is pivotal. See MARTIN SHUBIK, GAME
THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: CONCEPTS AND SOLUTIONS 200-04 (1982).  The analysis is
not affected, however, by one’s choice of assumptions or the index used.
There are 100 players (Senators) in the Senate.  Thus, there are 100! possible order-
ings in which a vote can take place.  Because each player has the same number of votes
(one) on a given piece of proposed legislation, each player has the same likelihood of being
the swing vote.  And, since each state is represented by the same number of players (two
Senators), each state has the same likelihood of being the swing vote.  Calculated precisely,
\\Server03\productn\C\CHP\4-1\CHP106.txt unknown Seq: 11 23-APR-01 17:19
2001] Federalist Revival 205
ately greater likelihood, relative to their shares of the nation’s
population, of being the swing vote on any proposed legislation.  In
the House, in contrast, where each state’s representation is sub-
stantially proportional to its population,27 the theoretical likeli-
hood that a small state is the swing vote on any proposed
legislation is roughly equal to its share of the population and
therefore small.28  This means that smaller states are less likely
than larger states to cast the deciding vote in the House.  In sum,
each state has a 2-in-100 chance to be the swing vote on any given piece of proposed legisla-
tion, and each state’s Shapley-Shubik index is therefore .02.
Although in this instance each state’s (and each player’s) Shapley-Shubik index is the
same as its voting strength, that will not always be the case.  Indeed, a major contribution
of the Shapley-Shubik index is to demonstrate the erroneousness of the common intuition
that the a priori power distribution inherent in a given apportionment of voting strength is
always a trivial function of the nominal voting strengths.  In particular, the Shapley-
Shubik index shows that large weighted majority games (such as the electoral college) give
a disproportionate power advantage to the big players, and that some voters may be inca-
pable of affecting the outcome of any proposed legislation even though they have a vote.
The former finding is presented in Irwin Mann & L.S. Shapley, The A Priori Voting
Strength of the Electoral College, in GAME THEORY AND RELATED APPROACHES TO SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR, 151-64 (Martin Shubik ed., 1964) (demonstrating that states with 16 or more
votes in the electoral college have a Shapley-Shubik index slightly greater than their num-
ber of votes, while states with 14 or fewer votes have a Shapley-Shubik index slightly
smaller than their number of votes).  The latter finding is demonstrated by the following
example:
Consider a game with four players (or coalitions) - A, B, C, d - with votes of 2, 2, 2, and
1, respectively.  A simple majority of four votes is needed to carry a motion.  In each of the
24 (4!) possible orderings of the four players, the pivot is italicized:
ABCd BACd BCAd BCdA
ABdC BAdC BdAC BdCA
AdBC CABd CBAd CBdA
AdCB CAdB CdAB CdBA
ACBd dABC dCAB dBCA
ACdB dACB dBAC dCBA
The Shapley-Shubik indices for A, B, C, and d are, respectively: 8/24 (.33), 8/24 (.33), 8/24
(.33), and 0/24 (0). See Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public
Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707, 730 n.83 (1991) [hereinafter Baker, Direct
Democracy].  Thus, although the player denoted d has 1/7 of the total voting strength in this
hypothetical body, it can be shown to have no power.  That is, it can be shown mathemati-
cally to be incapable of affecting the outcome of any motion, no matter how it votes. Id.; see
also SHUBIK, supra, at 24.  Similarly, in a game with three players with votes of 2, 2, and 1, R
respectively, each of the players has a Shapley-Shubik index of 0.33 if a simple majority of
three votes is required for passage.  Thus, even though one player has a voting strength
only one-half as large as the others’, his power to affect the outcome of any vote is identical
to theirs.
27 Because the Constitution provides that “each State shall have at Least one Repre-
sentative” no matter how small its population, the smallest states may be slightly over
represented in the House even though representation in that body is “apportioned among
the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
Thus, although California, for example, currently has 69 times the population of Wyoming
(33,145,121 versus 479,602), it has only 52 times as many Representatives in the House (52
versus 1). See THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 464-65 tbl.10.3. R
28 For two reasons, a small state’s Shapley-Shubik index will only approximate,
rather than be identical to, its share of the nation’s population.  First, as explained in note
26, supra, the smallest states’ voting strength in the House slightly exceeds their actual R
share of the nation’s population.  Second, as explained in note 26, supra, large weighted R
majority voting games such as the House give a disproportionate power advantage to the
big players.  For a complete listing of the various states’ current Shapley-Shubik power
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the Shapley-Shubik power index of a small state is larger in the
Senate than in the House.29
Of course, neither the House nor the Senate alone may enact
legislation; the approval of at least a simple majority present in
each body is required.30  Thus, one must determine each state’s
theoretical coalition-building power in the Congress as a whole.
In a previous Article, Samuel Dinkin and I presented the first
computer calculations of each state’s Shapley-Shubik power index
for Congress.31  These are set forth in Table 1.
TABLE 1
SHAPLEY-SHUBIK POWER INDICES FOR THE STATES
BASED ON 1990 CENSUS
S-Shubik Index S-Shubik Index S-Shubik Index
State Reps for House for Senate for Congress
CA 52 .130 .02 .081
NY 31 .073 .02 .049
TX 30 .070 .02 .047
FL 23 .053 .02 .038
PA 21 .048 .02 .035
IL 20 .046 .02 .034
OH 19 .044 .02 .033
MI 16 .036 .02 .029
NJ 13 .029 .02 .025
NC 12 .027 .02 .024
GA;VA 11 .025 .02 .023
MA;IN 10 .022 .02 .021
MO;WI;TN;WA 9 .020 .02 .020
MD;MN 8 .018 .02 .019
LA;AL 7 .016 .02 .018
KY;AZ;SC;CO;CT;OK 6 .013 .02 .016
OR;IA;MS 5 .011 .02 .015
KS;AR 4 .009 .02 .014
WV;UT;NE;NM 3 .007 .02 .013
ME;NV;NH;HI;ID;RI 2 .004 .02 .011
MT;SD;DE;ND; 1 .002 .02 .010
VT;AK;WY
Comparing any large and small state, these calculations re-
veal that the smaller state’s disproportionately great power in the
Senate, relative to its share of the nation’s population, is only very
slightly mitigated by the proportional representation that the
indices for the House, Senate, and Congress, and each state’s number of House Representa-
tives, see Table 1, infra.
29 See infra Table 1.  Similarly, the voting strength of a small state is greater in the
Senate than in the House. See supra note 26. R
30  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.  Sometimes, of course, more than a simple majority
of one or both chambers is required, as in the case of Senate filibusters, see supra note 26, R
in order to override a President’s veto, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, or where
supermajorities are required by the Constitution.
31 Baker & Dinkin, The Senate, supra note 11, at 26-27. R
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House provides.  Consider, for example, the following relation-
ships between California and Rhode Island:32
Population:33 29.7 to 1
Power in House:34 32.5 to 1
Power in Senate:35 1 to 1
Power in Congress:36 7.4 to 1
Counter-intuitively, the ratio of California’s and Rhode Island’s
power in Congress (7.4 to 1) turns out not to be the midpoint be-
tween the ratio of their power in the House and the Senate (16.25
to 1), but much more nearly approximates the ratio of their power
in the Senate (1 to 1) than the ratio of their power in the House
(32.5 to 1).
Of course, theoretical measures of coalition-building power
such as the Shapley-Shubik power index capture only part of the
complex reality.  The committee system, seniority, savvy, and cha-
risma—to name just a few variables—all affect a particular legis-
lator’s, and therefore a particular state’s, actual coalition-building
power in the Senate.  Happily, however, we need not attempt to
quantify these myriad, often intangible, variables.  For the equal
apportionment of representation in the Senate also determines
the likelihood that an especially powerful Senator—by any mea-
sure of influence—represents a particular state.
Thus, West Virginia, for example, has a 2-in-100 chance of
having one of its representatives chair all of the important Senate
committees and otherwise wield the influence that Senator Byrd
historically has.37  To be sure, this is the same 2-in-100 chance
32 Rhode Island was chosen because it receives two Representatives in the House. See
33 THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 464-65 tbl.10.3.  States such as Wyoming R
that receive only one Representative may be over represented in the House because of the
Constitution’s dictate that “each State shall have at Least one Representative” no matter
how small its share of the nation’s population.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. See supra note
27. R
33 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 20, at 23, tbl. 20.  According to the 1990 R
Census, upon which the apportionment of representation in Table 1 is based, the
population of California was 29,811,000 and the population of Rhode Island was 1,003,000.
34 See supra Table 1.
35 See supra Table 1.
36 See supra Table 1.
37 For example, Senator Byrd’s committee memberships have included Appropria-
tions, Armed Services, Budget, and Rules and Administration. See CONGRESSIONAL YEL-
LOW BOOK 56 (Eric L. Birholz ed., Fall 2000); see also Senator Byrd’s Committee
Assignments (visited Mar. 7, 2001) <http://www.senate.gov/~byrd/committee.htm>.  Many
observers have attributed Byrd’s extraordinary success in steering federal dollars to his
home state to his chairmanship of the Senate Appropriations Committee. See, e.g., Richard
Munson, Deforming Congress; Why Those Capitol Hill Budget Reforms Could Cost You
Plenty, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1993, at C3; Brian Kelly, Pigging Out at the White House;
Never Mind Last Week’s Spending Bonanza; George Bush Has Long Been a Closet Pork
Barreler, WASH. POST, Sept 6, 1992, at C1; see also BRIAN KELLY, ADVENTURES IN PORK-
LAND (1992) (highlighting Senator Byrd’s ability to obtain a relatively large share of federal
benefits for his small home state and crowning him “the Pope of Pork”); Drummond Ayres,
Jr., Senator Who Brings Home the Bacon, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1991, at A16 (detailing Sena-
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that California or Texas has, but it is much larger than the 3-in-
435 chance that West Virginia would have if representation in the
Senate were apportioned as it is in the House.38  That is, relative
to its share of the nation’s population, West Virginia has a dispro-
portionately great chance of having an especially powerful repre-
sentative in the Senate, while it has only a substantially
proportional chance of having an especially powerful representa-
tive in the House.
Given the absence of any constitutional constraints on the
modern Congress’s exercise of its spending power, the allocation of
coalition-building power in the Senate will importantly affect the
distribution of special legislation (“pork”) that Congress enacts
under the spending clause.  In the Senate, each state has the same
likelihood over time of providing the swing vote on a given piece of
proposed legislation,39 and each state’s Senators therefore have
the same power to secure special legislation that benefits their
constituents.  Thus, if the Senate alone could enact legislation,
and if all Senators were rationally self-interested,40 one would ex-
pect the total dollar amount of special legislation that each state
receives over time to be equal.  This means, however, that the per
capita benefits of the special legislation received would be sub-
stantially greater in small population states than in large ones.
When California and Wyoming each secure the equivalent of one
billion dollars in special legislation from the federal government,
for example, this amounts to $34 for each of California’s 29.8 mil-
lion residents, but $2,203—sixty-five times as much—for each of
Wyoming’s 454,000 residents.41  In the House, in contrast, repre-
sentation is allocated on the basis of population, and each state’s
coalition-building power within that body is substantially propor-
tional to its share of the nation’s population.42  Thus, if the House
alone could enact legislation, we would expect the total dollar
amount of each state’s benefits from all the special legislation en-
acted over time to be approximately proportional to its popula-
tor Byrd’s steering of over $750 million worth of federal projects and over 3,000 jobs into
West Virginia over a three-year period); Kevin Merida, Watchdog Group Cites Congress for
Barrelful of Porcine Projects, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1994, at A21 (observing that “watchdog
group” awarded Senator Byrd a “Lifetime Achievement” award for obtaining more tax dol-
lars than any other member of Congress for his home state).
38 See THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 464 tbl.10.3. R
39 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. R
40 This is a central assumption of the interest group theory component of public choice
theory. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 17, at 11-39; DANIEL A. FARBER & R
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12-37 (1991).
41 The 1990 Census determined the population of California to be 29,811,000 and the
population of Wyoming to be 454,000, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 20, at 23, tbl. 20. R
42 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. R
\\Server03\productn\C\CHP\4-1\CHP106.txt unknown Seq: 15 23-APR-01 17:19
2001] Federalist Revival 209
tion.43  And the per capita benefits to each state would therefore be
nearly the same.
But, of course, neither the House nor the Senate acting alone
can pass legislation.  The approval of at least a simple majority
present in each body is required.44  And, we would therefore expect
the total dollar amount of each state’s benefits from all the special
legislation enacted over time to be neither directly proportional to
its share of the nation’s population (House), nor equal (Senate),
but somewhere in between.  More specifically, one might expect
the percentage share of special legislation that each state will re-
ceive over time to approximate its Shapley-Shubik power index in
Congress.  The existing allocation of coalition-building power in
the Senate is likely to affect the distribution of the “gains” from
43 See supra note 27-28 and accompanying text.  It is a common misconception that if R
the House acting alone could enact legislation, a permanent majority coalition of large
states would form, depriving the smaller states of the benefits of Union membership while
imposing on them all of its costs.  This outcome, however, would require the congressional
logrolling “game” to have a permanent “core,” which it lacks.
Robert Sugden explains that a Condorcet choice provides the only “core solution” to the
logrolling game:
An outcome is said to be in the core of a game if it cannot be blocked by any coali-
tion of players.  Given the assumption that all preferences take the form of strict
orderings, a coalition of players blocks one outcome, x, if there is some other alter-
native, y, such that (i) every member of the coalition prefers y to x, and (ii) by the
rules of the game, concerted action by the members of the coalition can ensure that
y is the outcome of the game, irrespective of what non-members do . . . .  [A]n
alternative, x, is in the core of the majority rule game if and only if, for every other
feasible alternative, y, a majority of voters prefer x to y.  This of course is Condor-
cet’s criterion.  The core of the game is identical with the Condorcet choice.
ROBERT SUGDEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
WELFARE ECONOMICS 148 (1981).
In the following example, alternative 1 is the Condorcet winner, even though only A
prefers it to all other alternatives, because both A and B prefer 1 to 3, and both A and C
prefer 1 to 2:
A B C
1 2 3
2 1 1
3 3 2
See SUGDEN, supra, at 140, 147; DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 114-15 (1989);
Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75
VA. L. REV. 971, 989 n.55, 994-96 (1989).
Whenever a Condorcet choice does not exist—that is, whenever there is no single alter-
native that cannot be blocked by any coalition of voters even though it is not the first choice
of a majority—the legislative outcome will be a function of such “procedural” variables as
the order in which various alternatives are formally considered.  This is the “voting para-
dox,” frequently referred to as the Arrow “impossibility theorem.” See KENNETH J. ARROW,
SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951).  The theoretical significance of the paradox
was discussed by Black in the 1940’s. See DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND
ELECTIONS (1958); see also SUGDEN, supra, at 140; Levmore, supra, at 984-90; Richard H.
Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory,
Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990).
44 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.  Sometimes, of course, more than a simple majority
of one or both chambers is required, as in the case of Senate filibusters, see supra note 26, R
in order to override a President’s veto, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, or where
supermajorities are required by the Constitution.
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the special legislation that is enacted by ensuring small states a
disproportionately large slice, and large states a disproportion-
ately small slice, of the federal “pie.”  The prediction, in short, is
that the Senate’s current structure of representation ensures a
systematic redistribution of wealth from the larger states to the
smaller states.45
Empirical evidence supports this theoretical claim.  A Decem-
ber 1999 statistical study conducted by researchers at Harvard’s
Kennedy School of Government calculates the “balance of pay-
ments” that each state had with the federal government in fiscal
year 1998.46  Each state’s contribution to the federal fisc (i.e., indi-
vidual and corporate income taxes, social insurance taxes, excise
taxes, estate and gift taxes, and customs duties)47 is measured
against the federal outlays it received (e.g., Medicare, Social Se-
curity, public assistance including Unemployment Insurance, de-
fense spending, including veterans’ benefits, and non-defense
discretionary spending including federal programs in agriculture,
education, national parks, and transportation).48
The results are consistent with the prediction.  A regression
analysis of the data for all fifty states reveals that the Per Capita
Shapley-Shubik Index is a statistically significant (p < 0.05) ex-
planator of the Per Capita Balance of Payments between the
states and the federal government for Fiscal Year 1998.49  As Ta-
bles 2 and 3 reveal, the 1998 Fiscal Year balance of payments with
the federal government was negative in seven of the ten largest
states, but positive in eight of the ten smallest states.  The result
is an average per capita income transfer of -$542 for residents of
the ten largest states, compared to an average per capita income
transfer of +$657 for residents of the ten smallest states.
45 This prediction rests in part on the assumption that large and small states’ contri-
butions to the federal fisc are not systematically disproportional to their share of the na-
tion’s population.
46 See HERMAN B. LEONARD, ET AL., THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE STATES: FISCAL
YEAR 1998 (23rd ed. 1999) [hereinafter FY 1998 STUDY].  It is revealing that the federal
government, usually a font of statistics, does not appear to compile and publish such state-
by-state, balance of payments data.  The federal government does, however, publish one of
the two sets of data on which Leonard et al. base their calculations: the annual report of the
Bureau of the Census entitled Consolidated Federal Funds Report, a successor to the Cen-
sus Bureau’s annual report entitled Federal Expenditures by State. See id. at 93 (Appendix
A).  The tax collection data published by the I.R.S., however, “show which states collect the
taxes rather than those states that bear the burden of Federal taxes.” Id. at 95 (Appendix
B).  Thus, Leonard et al. relies on the “state by state tax estimates published by the non-
profit and non-partisan Tax Foundation.” Id.
47 Id. at 95.
48 Id. at 26-32; see also id. at 93, 95 (describing methodology).
49 For the details of how this regression analysis was performed, see Baker & Dinkin,
The Senate, supra note 11, at 103, app. 3.  In the present instance, the p value of the one- R
sided t-test is 0.0234, and the adjusted R2 of the regression is 0.189.  The null hypothesis is
rejected at the 5% level.  The results for Fiscal Year 1995 are similarly statistically signifi-
cant. See Baker & Dinkin, The Senate, supra note 11, at 103, app.3. R
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Such systematic redistribution is not problematic if there is a
principled justification for it.  Unfortunately, however, there does
not appear to be one.  The most obvious justification, poverty, does
not fully explain this systematic difference.  The rate of poverty in
the ten largest states is higher on average than in the ten smallest
states, yet the direction of the average federal income transfer is
from the larger to the smaller states.50  A statistical analysis con-
firms that even after controlling for each state’s poverty rate as
determined by the Census Bureau, the Shapley-Shubik index is
still a statistically significant explanator of the individual states’
balance of payments with the federal government.51
That a state has a small population does not make it, or its
residents, obviously more virtuous, needy, beneficial to the larger
society, or otherwise deserving of a disproportionately large share
of the federal fisc relative to large-population states and their re-
sidents.  Neither moral nor economic theory appears to offer any
justification for the type of redistribution ensured by the existing
allocation of representation in the Senate.  Thus, whatever one’s
conception of the “general Welfare” constraint of Article I, Section
8 might be,52 it is unlikely to encompass such redistribution.
TABLE 2
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:
FISCAL YEAR 199853
TEN LARGEST STATES
PER CAPITA POPULATION POVERTY
STATE INCOME TRANSFER (MILLIONS) RATE (%)
California −$595 32.7 17.8
New York −$948 18.2 19.4
Texas −$225 19.7 15.0
Florida +$118 15.0 14.0
Pennsylvania +$223 12.0 12.5
Illinois −$1,508 12.0 12.1
Ohio −$354 11.2 10.9
Michigan −$1,142 9.8 10.6
New Jersey −$2,289 8.1 11.2
North Carolina +$59 7.5 10.9
Total 146.2
Average per capita income transfer = −$542
Average poverty rate among these states = 14.6%
Average poverty rate nationwide = 13.6%
50 See infra Tables 2 and 3.
51 See supra note 50.
52 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States . . . .”).
53 See HERMAN B. LEONARD ET AL., THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE STATES: FISCAL
YEAR 1998 (23rd ed. 1998).
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TABLE 3
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS WITH THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 199854
TEN SMALLEST STATES
PER CAPITA POPULATION POVERTY
STATE INCOME TRANSFER (MILLIONS) RATE (%)
Wyoming +$228 0.5 13.8
Alaska +$2,376 0.6 12.0
Vermont +$170 0.6 10.3
North Dakota +$2,336 0.6 12.9
Delaware −$1,059 0.7 10.3
South Dakota +$1,655 0.7 15.4
Montana +$2,291 0.9 15.2
Rhode Island +$818 1.0 16.0
Idaho +$760 1.2 14.2
New Hampshire −$1,661 1.2 10.7
Total 8.0
Average per capita income transfer = +$657
Average poverty rate among these states = 13.2%
Average poverty rate nationwide = 13.6%
B. Conditional Federal Spending
Conditional federal spending is a second way in which the
modern Congress’s exercise of its spending power both infringes
on state autonomy and reduces aggregate social welfare.  A condi-
tional offer of federal funds to the states implicitly divides them
into two groups:55 (1) states that already comply, or would happily
comply, with the funding condition(s) without financial induce-
ment and for which the offer of federal money therefore poses no
real choice; and, (2) states that find the funding condition(s) unat-
tractive and therefore face the choice of foregoing the federal
funds in order to avoid complying with the condition(s), or submit-
ting to undesirable federal regulation in order to receive the of-
fered funds.
When the federal government makes a conditional offer of
funds, states in the second group are severely constrained in their
decision-making by the lack of equivalent, alternative sources of
revenue.  There is no competitor to the federal government to
which these states might turn for substitute financial assistance.
Although each state has the power to raise funds by taxing in-
come, purchases, and property within its borders,56 this power,
54 Id.
55 The exception would be the odd case in which every state liked the condition or—
even less probably—disliked it.
56 Insofar as the states did not, under Article I, Section 8, or under the Sixteenth
Amendment, surrender to Congress all of their power to tax income, purchases, and prop-
erty within their borders, some of this power may be understood to have been reserved to
\\Server03\productn\C\CHP\4-1\CHP106.txt unknown Seq: 19 23-APR-01 17:19
2001] Federalist Revival 213
too, is subject to indirect federal control.  Since the adoption in
1913 of the Sixteenth Amendment, which granted Congress the
power to tax income “from whatever source derived, [and] without
apportionment among the several States,”57 the states implicitly
have been able to tax only the income and property remaining to
their residents and property owners58 after the federal govern-
ment has taken its yearly share.59
This means, in addition, that when the federal government
offers a state money subject to unattractive conditions, it is often
offering funds that the state readily could have obtained without
those conditions through direct taxation—if the federal govern-
ment did not also have the power to tax income directly.60  Moreo-
ver, should a state decline proffered federal funds because it finds
a condition intolerable, it receives no rebate of any tax dollars that
the states under the Tenth Amendment.  Nonetheless, the people of a state may choose to
include in the state constitution certain restrictions on the ability of the state or its munici-
palities to raise funds through taxation, as in the case of California’s “Prop. 13.” See CAL.
CONST. art. XIII A; Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992) (sustaining Prop. 13 against an
equal protection challenge under the U.S. Constitution); Amador Valley Joint Union High
Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978) (sustaining Prop. 13
against various challenges under the United States and California constitutions); see also
Massachusetts’s “Proposition 2-1/2,” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (West. 2000).
These sorts of restrictions are relevant to my analysis only insofar as they may indi-
cate that a state, implicitly or explicitly, has chosen to rely more heavily on federal lar-
gesse, conditions and all.  That is, these self-imposed restrictions on the raising of revenue
are also part of the package of goods and services which a state offers to its residents and
potential residents.
57 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.  The Sixteenth Amendment overturned Pollock v. Farm-
ers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), and repealed Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the
Constitution, which had stated that “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, un-
less in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”
58 States may also impose “commuter taxes” on the income of those who work within
their borders but reside elsewhere. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 52 (1920):
[W]e deem it clear, upon principle as well as authority, that just as a State may
impose general income taxes upon its own citizens and residents whose persons
are subject to its control, it may, as a necessary consequence, levy a duty of like
character, and not more onerous in its effect, upon incomes accruing to non-re-
sidents from their property or business within the State, or their occupations car-
ried on therein . . . .
See also International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435, 441
(1944); 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION: CORPORATE
INCOME AND FRANCHISE TAXES ¶¶ 6.4 - 6.8 (2d ed. 1993); 2 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WAL-
TER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION: SALES AND USE, PERSONAL INCOME, AND DEATH AND
GIFT TAXES ¶¶ 20.15 to 20.33 (1992).
59 The federal government is constitutionally authorized to, and does, tax both indi-
vidual and corporate income.  See, e.g., Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 17-18
(1916) (sustaining federal income tax against Fifth Amendment challenge); Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 150 (1911) (upholding corporate income tax as an excise or indirect
tax, not subject to the apportionment rule of Article I, Section 9); BORIS I. BITTKER & MAR-
TIN J. MCMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 49.8, at 49-41 to -42
(1995); DANIEL Q. POSIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 33-40 (1993).
60 The exception is the purely theoretical possibility that the federal government
would undertake massive redistribution in favor of a particular state, and offer it an
amount of funds that it could not have raised directly from its own residents and property
owners.  A state’s willingness to tax is in any case always affected by the total package of
services and taxes that it chooses to offer its residents and potential residents.
\\Server03\productn\C\CHP\4-1\CHP106.txt unknown Seq: 20 23-APR-01 17:19
214 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 4:195
its residents have paid into the federal fisc.  In these cases, the
state (through its residents) contributes a proportional share of
federal revenue only to receive less than a proportional share of
federal spending.  Thus, when the federal government offers the
states money, it can be understood as simply offering to return the
states’ money to them, often with unattractive conditions
attached.61
Through the enactment of conditional federal spending legis-
lation, a simple majority of states is able to harness the federal
lawmaking power to restrict the competition for residents and tax
dollars that would otherwise exist among them.62  In the usual
course of affairs, each of the fifty states chooses the package of
taxes and services, including state constitutional rights and other
laws, that it will offer its residents and potential residents.63  In
this way, the states compete for both individual and corporate re-
sidents and their tax dollars.64  As part of its unique package, a
state might choose, for example, to prohibit the use of “affirmative
61 I am not the first to make this observation.  My colleague, Lino A. Graglia, for ex-
ample, has noted that:
The Sixteenth Amendment, establishing the income tax, effectively gave the na-
tional government unlimited control of the nation’s wealth and, consequently, a
virtually unlimited spending power. . . .  By extracting money from the now-de-
fenseless states and offering to return it with strings attached, the national gov-
ernment is able to control by promises of reward—some would say bribery—
whatever it might be unable or unwilling to control by threat of punishment.
Lino A. Graglia, From Federal Union to National Monolith: Mileposts in the Demise of
American Federalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 130-31 (1993); see also Thomas R.
McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism’s Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP.
CT. REV. 85, 124 (“[F]or most states’ voters the only real question is how much they can get
back in federal financial handouts.  There is no immediate sense that it is their own money
being returned to them with strings attached and that the net effect of the money’s round
trip to Washington is simply to carry the regulatory strings with it back to the state.” (em-
phasis added)).
62 Although the concurrence of a simple majority of states may be sufficient, those
eager to enact such legislation will often seek to build a coalition of supporting states that
is larger than the minimum number necessary for passage. See supra note 16.  Moreover, R
the concurrence of a simple majority of states will always be sufficient for passage only in
the Senate.  Whether the same simple majority of states will also be sufficient for passage
in the House will depend on the populations of the relevant states.  Assuming that each
state’s representatives vote together on a given issue, a small number of large states is
likely to need fewer additional votes in the House in order to block legislation to which it is
opposed than will the same small number of small states.  Indeed, the nine largest states
together control a majority (227) of the House’s 435 total members. See STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT, supra note 20, at 282, tbl. 461. R
63 This is not a one-time decision but a choice that a state makes repeatedly over time.
In addition, when selecting its package of taxes and services, a state may be influenced by
its assessment of the likely availability of federal funds—whether conditional or not—for
certain purposes.
64 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).  For commentary on Tiebout’s classic model, see, e.g, CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & LYNN
A. BAKER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 384 (1999) (collecting sources);
Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 514-18 (1991) (offering critique and collecting
sources).
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action” in the admission of students to its public universities, to
prohibit the death penalty, to provide a constitutional or statutory
right to same-sex “civil unions,” or to prohibit the purchase or pub-
lic possession of alcoholic beverages by any person who is less
than eighteen years of age.  The resulting choices can be under-
stood as a state’s determination that, for it, the benefits of a par-
ticular provision of state statutory or constitutional law exceeds
the costs.65
A state’s statutory or constitutional recognition of same-sex
“civil unions,” for example, could be understood as its determina-
tion that, for it, the benefits of formally recognizing intimate rela-
tionships that some consider morally repugnant outweigh the
costs.  In the absence of a federal government, a state that for-
mally recognizes only marriages between a man and a woman
would have only two ways to compete with a state, such as Ver-
mont, that chooses also to formally recognize same-sex unions.66
The former state could continue to offer its current package of
taxes and services, including the formal recognition of marriages
involving only two persons of different sexes, and seek to attract
(and retain) those individuals and corporations who prefer this
package.  Or, the state could make some adjustment(s) to its pack-
age, which may include adopting a statutory or constitutional pro-
vision formally recognizing same-sex unions.67
Conditional federal spending, however, provides the majority
of states, which do not formally recognize same-sex civil unions, a
third, competition-impeding option whenever a state might choose
to formally recognize such relationships:  The majority’s congres-
sional representatives could simply enact an appropriately condi-
tioned offer of federal funds in order to divest the outlier state of
any competitive gains from its action.68  By supporting legislation
65 By a “state’s determination” is meant, of course, the judgment of the voters of the
state as expressed either indirectly (through the election of state legislators) or directly
(through the state constitution’s amendment process, an initiative process, or the election
of judges).  Of course, some individuals and interest groups may have more influence than
others on the outcome of these democratic processes.
66 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, ch. 23, § 1, (2000); see also E.J. Graff, Civil Unions are
Homemaking Here for a Reason, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 11, 2001, available in 2001 WL
3919109 (observing that within six months of the enactment of Vermont’s “civil union” law,
“1,527 couples, only one-fifth of them Vermont residents, had been declared legally united
for purposes of Vermont law”).
67 An obvious third option—simply lowering taxes—is not really available.  Because
the revenue a state generates through taxation is necessary to provide various services,
any decrease in taxes is likely to bring a concomitant reduction in service provision.  Al-
though this combination of changes may make the state more attractive to residents whose
preferred package of taxes and services is different from that currently offered by the state,
it cannot make the state more attractive to residents who would prefer to receive the cur-
rent package of services, but at a reduced cost.
68 The fact that Congress nonetheless to date has not enacted or proposed an offer of
federal funds thus conditioned is not surprising nor does it contradict the proposed theory
of how and why Congress makes these conditional offers.  The Vermont law is of recent
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that offers the states federal funds on the condition that they not
formally recognize same-sex marriages or civil unions, a coalition
of the states that are unwilling to formally recognize such rela-
tionships can put any state that does to an unattractive choice:
either abandon the competitive advantage that its formal recogni-
tion of same-sex unions presumably affords, or forego the offered
federal funds and accept an obvious financial disadvantage rela-
tive to each state that accepts the federal money.  In this way, con-
ditional offers of federal funds necessarily make the states that
without financial inducement would not willingly comply with the
funding condition relatively worse off than they would have been
in the absence of the offer, while making all other states, by impli-
cation, relatively better off.
Through the enactment of conditional federal spending legis-
lation, a simple majority of states is able to harness the federal
lawmaking power to force some states to pay more than others
(including themselves) for their preferred package of laws.  This is
especially problematic when the funding condition seeks to re-
duce—to the minimums mandated by the U.S. Constitution and
federal statutes—the heightened statutory or constitutional pro-
tection that a small number of outlier states currently provide cer-
tain minorities.69  In these cases, one might expect the increased
vintage, and it may therefore take Congress a few sessions to propose and enact the pre-
dicted legislation.  Should such legislation never be enacted, one still cannot conclude that
this is because a minority state such as Vermont, which favors the formal recognition of
same-sex intimate relationships, can protect itself effectively within the federal political
process.  The absence of such federal legislation may simply mean that a sufficiently large
number of federal legislators have not yet considered it a high priority. But see H.R. 270,
107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001) (“State Regulation of Marriage Is Appropriate Act”); Christo-
pher Heredia, Rep. Frank Goes for Round 2 in Fight for Allowing Gay Marriage, SAN FRAN-
CISCO CHRONICLE, Jan. 26, 2001, available in 2001 WL 3393376 (discussing bill introduced
by Rep. Barney Frank “seeking to undo a 1996 federal definition of marriage as an institu-
tion between a man and a woman” and seeking “to hold Vice President Dick Cheney’s feet
to the fire after Cheney stated in October that he would support a state’s right to determine
whether to sanction same-sex unions”).
69 Increasingly, states have expanded their constitutional protections for individual
rights beyond the federal minimums in a variety of ways: by adopting a constitutional pro-
vision that is explicitly more expansive than its federal counterpart, see, e.g., CHESTER J.
ANTIEAU ET AL., RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1965); Robert F. Williams,
Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1212-14 (1985); by
adopting a constitutional provision that has no federal counterpart, see, e.g., N.J. CONST.
art. VIII, § 4 (the right to a free public education); N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (the right to
public assistance); Burt Neuborne, Foreward: State Constitutions and the Evolution of Pos-
itive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 893 (1989); and by more expansive judicial interpreta-
tion of a constitutional provision than the federal courts afford its federal counterpart, see,
e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Consti-
tutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548-49 (1986); William J.
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489, 500 (1977); see also Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Change and Direct Democracy, 66
U. COLO. L. REV. 143, 154-58 (1995) (comparing state and federal procedures for constitu-
tional change) [hereinafter Baker, Constitutional Change]; Suzanna Sherry, Foreward:
State Constitutional Law: Doing the Right Thing, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 935 (1994) (discussing
judicial construction of state constitutions and citing examples).
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cost of the protection, measured in terms of foregone federal
funds, to cause an outlier state readily to relinquish it.  After all,
the greatest and most direct benefits of such heightened protec-
tion will typically accrue to a relatively small and powerless seg-
ment of the state’s voters,70 while the proffered federal funds may
well be of direct benefit to a substantial majority.71
By providing a competition-impeding alternative to interstate
competition, conditional offers of federal funds reduce the diver-
sity among the states in the package of taxes and services, includ-
ing state constitutional rights and other laws, which each offers.72
Thus, some individuals and corporations may no longer find any
state that provides a package (including the formal recognition of
same-sex civil unions, for example) that suits their preferences,
while other individuals and corporations may confront a surfeit of
states offering a package (including a prohibition against legally
recognized same-sex unions) that they find attractive.  The net re-
sult is likely to be a decrease in aggregate social welfare, since the
loss in welfare to opponents of same-sex unions is unlikely under
these circumstances to yield a comparable gain in welfare for
those who favor it.73
At present, several states have statutes that provide protection against various forms
of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation while federal law does not.  Compare,
for example, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-81e (1999) (prohibiting housing discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation) and HAW. REV. STAT. § 368-1 (1999) (prohibiting housing dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation) with 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2000) (prohibiting
housing discrimination only on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin”—with “familial status” referring not to sexual orientation but to “one or
more individuals (who have not attained the age of 18 years) being domiciled with (1) a
parent or another person having legal custody of such individual or individuals; or (2) the
designee of such parent or other person having such custody.” Id. at § 3602(k)).  And com-
pare CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (2000) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation) and HAW. GEN. STAT. § 368-1 (2000) (prohibiting employment dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (prohibiting
employment discrimination only on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin”) and 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of
age).
70 On some occasions, of course, the minority might be rich and, therefore, also poten-
tially politically powerful.  There may also be reasons why the “discrete and insular” status
of even non-wealthy minorities actually enhances their political power. See Bruce A. Ack-
erman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723-24 (1985). But see Donald A.
Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t
Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079,
1081 (1993).
71 The benefits of the proffered funds may also be more salient to the majority than
the benefits of a statutory or constitutional provision protecting minority rights.  Consider,
for example, the salience to the median voter of a grant of federal education funds to the
local school district versus a state prohibition against the death penalty.
72 This reduction in diversity results if even one state that would not have complied
with the federal condition in the absence of the contingent offer of funds chooses to comply
rather than to forego the funds.
73 That is, the mere existence of one state in which same-sex unions are formally rec-
ognized seems likely to yield aggregate benefits for proponents of such recognition which
are far greater than the aggregate benefits that the opponents of formal recognition of
\\Server03\productn\C\CHP\4-1\CHP106.txt unknown Seq: 24 23-APR-01 17:19
218 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 4:195
II. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF TRADITIONAL MEANS OF LIMITING
CONGRESS’S SPENDING POWER
The discussion in Part I makes clear that formalists and func-
tionalists alike should favor the restoration of limits on Congress’s
spending power.  A less plenary conception of the spending power
would not only be more consistent with the Framers’ intent, it
would also increase aggregate social welfare.  But how do we get
from here to there?  How might limits once again be imposed on
Congress’s spending power?
In this Part, I consider two promising possibilities.  First, if
one’s concern is protecting state autonomy, perhaps no constitu-
tional limits on Congress’s spending power are necessary.  Per-
haps the state-based nature of representation in Congress affords
the states adequate protection against autonomy-infringing exer-
cises of the congressional spending power.  Second, a constraint on
Congress’s spending power could, in theory, be explicitly reim-
posed via the Constitution’s amendment process.  Examples pro-
posed in recent years include the Balanced Budget Amendment
and supermajority rules for the passage of certain spending legis-
lation.  Notwithstanding the plausibility of each of these means of
limiting Congress’s spending power, the analysis in this Part
shows, perhaps surprisingly, that each is doomed to failure.
A. Protections of the Political Process
When concerns are expressed about the scant protections af-
forded the states under modern readings of the Constitution, a
now-classic response is to invoke the nature of the federal political
process.74  The political process argument contends that there is
no need for the federal courts to invalidate federal legislation that
may encroach on the autonomy of the states because of the role
that the states themselves play in the enactment of federal legis-
same-sex unions would realize if there were 50 rather than 49 states in which only mar-
riages between two persons of different sexes were formally recognized.  Indeed, for propo-
nents of the formal recognition of same-sex unions, the sole state in which such
relationships are formally recognized may have a value beyond measure.
74 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1995)
(“State sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards in-
herent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on fed-
eral power.”); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 877 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he extent of federal intervention into the States’ affairs in the exercise of
delegated powers shall be determined by the States’ exercise of political power through
their representatives in Congress.”); United States v. Morrison, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 1771 (2000)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“State sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by
procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially
created limitations on federal power.”) (quoting Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 956 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“ ‘The principal means chosen by
the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of
the Federal Government itself.’ ”) (quoting Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-51).
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lation.  That is, the states are arguably fully capable of protecting
themselves against federal oppression through the federal politi-
cal process, so there is simply no need for further, external limits
on Congress’s spending power.
Consider the reasoning of Professor Herbert Wechsler who,
along with Professor Jesse Choper, is the scholar with whom this
argument is commonly associated.75  Wechsler has observed that
the Senate, in which all states are equally represented, “cannot
fail to function as the guardian of state interests as such,” and
that “[f]ederalist considerations . . . play an important part even in
the selection of the President.”76  He has therefore concluded that
“the Court is on weakest ground when it opposes its interpretation
of the Constitution to that of Congress in the interest of the states,
whose representatives control the legislative process and, by hy-
pothesis, have broadly acquiesced in sanctioning the challenged
Act of Congress.”77
The central problem with Wechsler’s analysis is that he mis-
identifies the problem.  While the state-based apportionment of
representation within the federal government78 may well ensure
that “state interests as such” are protected against federal oppres-
sion, federal oppression is not the problem.79  The problem, rather,
75 Sometimes called the Wechsler-Choper thesis, this argument was presented first in
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954), and
later in JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980).
See also Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Feder-
alism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 293 (2000) (criticizing Wechsler’s particular arguments but
contending that there “are ‘political safeguards’ of federalism, safeguards that have a
longer pedigree and a stronger claim to constitutional legitimacy than the current Supreme
Court’s clumsy bid to impose its will on Congress”).
76 Wechsler, supra note 75, at 548, 557.  Wechsler’s discussion was cited approvingly R
by the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 550,
551 n.11 (1985) (“It is no novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Govern-
ment was designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress.”),
and by the dissent in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 877 (1976) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he extent of federal intervention into the States’ affairs in the exer-
cise of delegated powers shall be determined by the States’ exercise of political power
through their representatives in Congress.”). See also supra note 74.
77 Wechsler, supra note 75, at 559 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 558 (“Far from a R
national authority that is expansionist by nature, the inherent tendency in our system is
precisely the reverse . . . .”).
78 The state-based allocation of representation in the Senate is obvious: each state
receives two senators and therefore has formal equality in representation. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 3, cl. 1.  Although representation in the House is proportional to population, it too
is state-based insofar as each state is ensured one representative no matter how small its
population, representatives are allocated by state, and House districts do not cross state
lines. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.  Even the President is ultimately elected by the
states, insofar as each state receives “a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of
Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress[.]” U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see also Wechsler, supra note 75, at 547-50, 552-55. R
79 It is not clear what Wechsler means by “state interests as such” or the (presumably)
opposed “federal interests as such.”  Juxtaposing these two sets of interests is nonetheless
common in the context of conditional federal spending, especially by commentators who, in
\\Server03\productn\C\CHP\4-1\CHP106.txt unknown Seq: 26 23-APR-01 17:19
220 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 4:195
lies in the ability of some states to harness the federal lawmaking
power to oppress other states.  Not only can the state-based alloca-
tion of congressional representation not protect states against this
use of the federal lawmaking power, it facilitates it.
Wechsler’s observation about the Senate’s role in protecting
state autonomy is especially ironic in the context of fiscal redistri-
bution among the states.  The analysis in Part I.A. showed that
under a scheme of purely proportional representation, such as the
House provides, one would not expect Congress’s spending legisla-
tion to reveal systematic fiscal redistribution from the larger
states to the smaller states.  This redistribution, with its attend-
ant impingement on the autonomy of the large states that system-
atically bear its costs, occurs solely because of the
disproportionately great (because “equal”) representation that the
Senate affords small-population states.
As a theoretical matter, it is therefore clear that the state-
based allocation of Congressional representation cannot protect
the large states against autonomy-infringing (and aggregate-wel-
fare reducing) fiscal redistribution.  As an empirical matter, the
discussion in Part I.A. also makes clear that the state-based allo-
cation of Congressional representation does not protect the large
states against this encroachment on their autonomy.
Conditional federal spending legislation is no different.  The
state-based apportionment of representation in Congress does not
prevent, and in fact facilitates, the ability of some states to har-
ness the federal lawmaking power to encroach on the autonomy of
other states to their own advantage.  Recall that a conditional of-
fer of federal funds to the states implicitly divides them into two
groups.80  One would therefore expect such conditional funding
legislation to be enacted only if a (substantial) majority of states
fall within the first group: that is, if they already willingly comply
with, or favor, the stated condition, and the conditional offer of
funds is therefore no less attractive to them than a similar uncon-
ditional offer.81  Few congressional representatives, after all,
contrast to Wechsler, are concerned that “state interests as such” are less likely to be ad-
vanced by Congress than “federal interests as such.” See, e.g, Lewis B. Kaden, Politics,
Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 860-68 (1979);
McCoy & Friedman, supra note 61, at 123-25. R
Although Wechsler focuses on the state-based allocation of representation in Congress,
he nonetheless suggests that oppression by the “national authority,” rather than the op-
pression of some states by other states, is the problem which the structure of representa-
tion avoids. See Wechsler, supra note 75, at 558 (The national political process “is R
intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on the
domain of the states.”) (emphasis added).
80 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. R
81 As was explained in note 16, supra, in practice, proponents of legislation will strive R
to secure a supermajority of votes because of the uncertainty under which pre-vote lobbying
and logrolling take place.
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should be eager to support legislation that gives the states money
only if they comply with a condition that a majority of their own
constituents would independently find unattractive.82
The conditional offer of federal funds to the states suggested
by President Clinton in response to United States v. Lopez directly
supports this theory.83  At the time the President spoke, more than
forty states had already enacted prohibitions on the possession of
guns in or near schools.84  Thus, only a (small) minority of states
would be posed a choice by the President’s suggested offer of fed-
eral funds, and the representatives of those states would likely
have scant ability within the political process to prevent the legis-
lation’s passage.  Their best hope would be to trade votes with the
requisite number of members of the majority coalition, exchanging
their support on a matter of greater concern to those states for
82 A legislator is less likely to be re-elected if the median voter in her constituency
believes that she voted “the wrong way” on an important issue.  And it is an axiom of politi-
cal science and theory that legislators’ primary, but not sole, concern is winning reelection.
See, e.g., ARNOLD, LOGIC, supra note 16, at 5 (Although members of Congress “are not sin- R
gle-minded seekers of reelection, reelection is their dominant goal.”); FRANK E. SMITH, CON-
GRESSMAN FROM MISSISSIPPI 127 (1964) (“All members of Congress have a primary interest
in being re-elected.  Some members have no other interest.”); William H. Riker & Barry R.
Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of
Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REV. 373, 396 (1988) (A legislator is “a
placeholder opportunistically building up an ad hoc majority for the next election.”); Mark
Tushnet, Principles, Politics, and Constitutional Law, 88 MICH. L. REV. 49, 51-53 (1988)
(discussing normative implications of “orientation toward reelection”).
Thus, ceteris paribus, a member of Congress should prefer to support legislation that
gives the states money if they comply with a condition that a majority of her constituents
find unproblematic, if not positively attractive, rather than identical legislation that im-
poses a condition that a majority of her constituents would otherwise find unattractive or
even oppressive.  Of course, other things are not always equal, and an individual legislator
may nonetheless choose to support conditional funding legislation of the latter sort if she
predicts that the benefits to her, in terms of reelection campaign contributions and other
support from state or national interest groups will outweigh the costs, in terms of lost votes
and other support within her district.  Or a legislator may sometimes choose to express a
preference at odds with that of a majority of her electorate and support conditional funding
legislation of the latter sort, especially if she does not believe her reelection to be at risk.
See, e.g., ARNOLD, LOGIC, supra note 16, at 5; RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN R
COMMITTEES 1 (1973).  In recent years, a lively academic debate has grown up around the
extent to which legislators enact their own ideological preferences rather than those of
interest groups or their constituents. See, e.g., Baker, Direct Democracy, supra note 26 at R
740 n.117 (1991); FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 40, at 27; Jerry L. Mashaw, The Econom- R
ics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123, 143-50
(1989).
83 Three days after the Court’s ruling in Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), President Clinton
proclaimed that he was “determined to keep guns out of our schools,” and contended that
Congress would not run afoul of the Constitution if it now chose to “encourage states to ban
guns from school zones by linking Federal funds to enactment of school-zone gun bans.”
Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Seeks Way to Retain Gun Ban in School Zones, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
30, 1995, at A1; see Ann Devroy & Al Kamen, Clinton Says Gun Ruling Is a Threat; Presi-
dent Will Seek To Renew Ban on Schoolyard Firearms, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1995, at A1.
84 See Purdum, supra note 83, at A1; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 R
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing state statutes regulating possession of guns in school
zones).
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help in opposing the condition on federal funds.85  Of course, the
likelihood of success of such a vote trading effort is positively cor-
related with the number and size of states in the minority
coalition.86
One question remains:  Why would a state’s congressional
representatives ever prefer to enact a conditional rather than an
unconditional offer of federal funds to the states, including their
own?  Several possibilities merit discussion.  To begin, legislators
might support a conditional offer of funds in order to “entice” out-
lier states into amending or adopting some provision(s) of state
constitutional or statutory law.87  To the extent that Congress, at
least after New York and Lopez, cannot always directly regulate
the states in the ways it might prefer,88 an offer of appropriately
conditioned federal funds may be the only means to certain regu-
latory ends.  By proposing or supporting legislation to lure outlier
states into adopting these regulations, individual legislators may
garner the approval of “single issue” voters and interest groups
who may provide re-election votes as well as nationwide financial
and other support for their next campaign.89
85 This assumes, of course, that the residents of the states in the minority have a
sufficiently intense preference regarding the proposed legislation that they are willing to
trade their states’ vote on other legislative matters in order to block its passage.
The classic discussion of vote trading or logrolling is BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note
17, at 131-45; see also Baker, Direct Democracy, supra note 26 at 721-32; GILLETTE & R
BAKER, supra note 64, at 268-72. R
86 Assuming that each state’s legislators vote together on a given issue, a larger mi-
nority of states will need fewer additional votes in the Senate in order to block legislation to
which it is opposed than will a smaller minority of states.  Thus, ceteris paribus, any vote
trading effort to secure the additional votes should have a greater likelihood of success, and
should be easier to achieve, when the minority undertaking it is larger rather than smaller.
See Baker, Direct Democracy, supra note 26 at 730-31. R
By the “size” of states is meant their population.  This variable matters in any discus-
sion of vote trading in Congress because population determines the number of representa-
tives and, therefore, votes that a state will have in the House. See supra note 27. R
87 This was President Clinton’s express aim when he made his post-Lopez suggestion
that Congress “encourage states to ban guns from school zones by linking Federal funds to
enactment of school-zone gun bans.” See Purdum, supra note 83, at A1. R
88 See Baker, Conditional Federal Spending, supra note 12, at 1911-12; Baker, The R
Revival of States’ Rights, supra note 12, at 96-100. See also New York v. United States, 505 R
U.S. 144 (1992); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
89 At least one commentator has speculated that this was the motivation underlying
Congress’s enactment of the Gun-Free School Zones Act invalidated in Lopez. See Jerome
L. Wilson, High Court Did Well in School-Guns Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1994, at A30
(“[T]he Gun-Free School Zones Act was little more than a press release from Congress that
it cared.”); cf. United States v. Morrow, 834 F. Supp. 364, 366 (N.D. Ala. 1993) (“A genera-
lized salutary purpose is simply not enough to justify the creation of a new federal crime.
Liking the way ‘Gun-Free School Zones’ rolls off the tongue does not make § 922(q)
constitutional.”).
In recent years, highly controversial candidates for governor and the U.S. Senate, no-
tably David Duke and Oliver North, have received as much financial and other campaign
support from outside their respective states as from within.  On David Duke, see, e.g., Su-
san Gilmore, Hundreds in State Donated to Duke, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 29, 1991, at C1
(“More than 200 Washington state residents gave more than $11,000 to David Duke’s un-
successful race . . .”); Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: ‘America Be on Guard,’ N.Y. TIMES,
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In addition, legislators might thus win the votes of rationally
self-interested constituents who believe that certain activities in
another state impose negative externalities on them.  Consider,
for example, the federal regulation at issue in South Dakota v.
Dole.  Voters in a state that, consistent with the regulation, al-
ready prohibited “the purchase or public possession . . . of any al-
coholic beverage by a person who is less than twenty-one years of
age”90 might reasonably believe that there would be fewer alcohol-
related accidents on their own state’s highways if their young re-
sidents no longer had an incentive to commute to border states
where the drinking age is lower and, therefore, were less likely “to
combine their desire to drink with their ability to drive.”91
Sometimes members of Congress might support conditional
funding legislation not in order to encourage interstate conformity
in some area, but in the hope that some state(s) might decline the
offer of federal funds.92  States that forego the conditional federal
Nov. 19, 1991, at A15 (47% of Duke’s total campaign contributions were from people in 45
states other than Louisiana).  On Oliver North, see, e.g., Margaret Edds, North Still Asking
Faithful Followers to Dig a Little Deeper, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Nov. 16, 1994, at
C1 (North raised more money than any candidate in U.S. Senate history, almost $20 mil-
lion, from more than 200,000 contributors nationwide); Michael Ross, Another Epic Battle
Plays Out in Virginia, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1994, at A20 (“North has raised more money—
$17.6 million—than any other Senate candidate this year, most of it from out of state”); see
also Andrew Mollison, Outside funds are politics as usual; Study tracks cash for hot state
races, ATLANTA JOURNAL & CONSTITUTION, Nov. 18, 1991, at A3 (“a big surge of private
funds across state lines for important U.S. Senate and gubernatorial races is politics as
usual, according to nine-state study”).
The growth of political parties as national rather than local sources of political influ-
ence may also be a factor in the rise of nationwide support for candidates in statewide
elections. See, e.g., JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF
POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 15 (1995) (arguing that “the party provides more support [of
all kinds] than any other organization for all but a very few candidates for national and
state offices” (emphasis added)); L. Sandy Maisel, Political Parties in a Nonparty Era:
Adapting to a New Role, in PARTIES AND POLITICS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 259, 269 (L. Sandy
Maisel & William G. Shade eds., 1994) (“[E]ach party has used opportunities . . . to mount
unified, coordinated campaigns throughout the country and thus the national parties have
been able to finance local efforts.”); JOHN S. SALOMA III & FREDERICK H. SONTAG, PARTIES:
THE REAL OPPORTUNITY FOR EFFECTIVE CITIZEN POLITICS (1972); Michael A. Fitts, Can Ig-
norance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence in Political Institutions, 88
MICH. L. REV. 917 (1990); Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective
on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1988); Kaden,
supra note 79, at 859-60, 862-67; Jonathan R. Macey, The Role of the Democratic and Re- R
publican Parties as Organizers of Shadow Interest Groups, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1990).
90 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987) (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1982 ed.,
Supp. III)).
91 Id. at 208 (“Congress found that the differing drinking ages in the States created
particular incentives for young persons to combine their desire to drink with their ability to
drive, and that this interstate problem required a national solution.”); see also 130 CONG.
REC. S18,640 (daily ed. June 26, 1984) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg); id. at S18,644
(statement of Sen. Heinz).
92 Although it is not at all clear that this was Congress’s aim, there are several in-
stances in which states have chosen to decline an offer of funds rather than comply with
the attached condition. See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. 203; Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947). But see 131 CONG. REC. S15,202 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1985)
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revenue enable the other states to profit at their expense.  By not
receiving their proportionate share of the funds offered under the
conditional grant, such states leave more money in the federal fisc
for other purposes, and thus may well receive a smaller share of
the total federal pie in a given year than they would have if they
had accepted the conditional offer.93
Whatever a particular legislator’s motivation might be, sup-
porting a conditional grant of federal funds to the states is likely
to make her state (and therefore herself) better off, and should
only rarely make it (and herself) worse off, if her state already
complies, or without financial inducement would happily comply,
with the funding condition.94  For these states and their congres-
sional representatives, a vote in favor of the conditional grant is
nearly always a vote to impose a burden solely on other states.
Whether a state that is not already in compliance chooses to de-
cline the offer of federal funds or to acquiesce in the stated condi-
tion, those states already in compliance may well improve, and
will only rarely worsen, their competitive position relative to that
state.95
It is also worth noting that insofar as conditional federal
spending legislation is simply a particular form of special legisla-
tion or “pork,” the allocation of representation (and therefore also
coalition-building power) in the Senate will affect its distribution
as well.  As in the case of other fiscal legislation, one would expect
(statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (“Congress did not pass Public Law 98-363 [at issue in
Dole] in order to withhold highway funds”).
93 This assumes that the funds remaining in the federal fisc will be allocated substan-
tially proportionally across the states.  In the Dole context, Richard Epstein has described
the problem as follows:
South Dakota must continue to pay the same level of taxes, even though the
money it contributes is diverted to other states.  The offer of assistance is not an
isolated transaction, but must (as with the thief who will resell stolen goods to its
[sic] true owner) be nested in its larger coercive context.  The situation in Dole is
scarcely distinguishable from one in which Congress says that it will impose a tax
of x percent on a state that does not comply with its alcohol regulations—a rule
that is wholly inconsistent with the preservation of any independent domain of
state power.  The grant of discretion, therefore, allows the federal government to
redistribute revenues, raised by taxes across the nation, from those states that
wish to assert their independence under the Twenty-first Amendment, to those
states that do not.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 152 (1993).
94 The exception is when a majority of the citizens of a state, within a relatively brief
period of time, change their view on an issue, such as the death penalty, which is the focus
of a conditional offer of federal funds.  In these rare instances, a state that previously found
the funding condition attractive may find that it no longer does, and that it too is therefore
relatively worse off than it would have been if Congress had never made the conditional
offer of funds.  Thus, it is possible, if highly unlikely, that Congress may impose a condition
on federal funds that at some point is attractive to, and thus renders compliance costless
for, no state.
95 By “competitive position” here I mean a state’s position, relative to other states, in
the competition for individual and corporate residents and their tax dollars. See supra
notes 62-65 and accompanying text. R
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the small states to benefit disproportionately—and the large
states to be disadvantaged disproportionately—by conditional of-
fers of federal funds to the states.  Thus, it seems clear that the
state-based allocation of congressional representation can neither
protect the large states against autonomy-infringing, conditional
federal spending nor prevent the concomitant reduction in aggre-
gate social welfare.
B. Amending the Constitution
A second possible way to restore limits on Congress’s spend-
ing power is by the adoption of a constitutional amendment.  In
recent years, scholars interested to curtail the rise of the special
interest state have in fact proposed amendments that, for exam-
ple, would require the consent of a supermajority to pass certain
spending legislation.96  In addition, Congress itself has considered
amendments, such as the Balanced Budget Amendment, that
would impose limits on its spending power.97
The analysis provided in Part I above, however, suggests that
all these amendment possibilities are highly likely to remain no
more than that.  In that Part, I demonstrated that the existing
rules governing the enactment of conditional and all other federal
spending legislation have a clearly identifiable group of system-
atic beneficiaries—the small population states that are afforded
disproportionately great (because equal) representation in the
Senate, and therefore also in Congress, relative to their shares of
the nation’s population.  Based on the 1990 Census, thirty-two
states currently are over-represented in the Senate.98  Each might
be expected to oppose the adoption of a constitutional amendment
that would adversely affect its continued ability to obtain a dispro-
portionately large share of the federal “pie.”  Under Article V, the
96 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael R. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Con-
stitutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365 (1999) (proposing amendment to U.S.
Constitution that would require an unspecified supermajority of each house of Congress to
pass a resolution authorizing the government to spend more than 90% of the total amount
spent in the previous year, and would similarly require a supermajority to pass bills that
establish or expand “entitlement programs”).
97 The Balanced Budget Amendment of 1995, H.R.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong., would have
required a balanced budget unless three-fifths of each house authorizes a budgetary deficit.
See id. § 2.  The Amendment failed to secure the two-thirds majority necessary for a consti-
tutional amendment by a margin of 65 to 35 in favor of adoption. See 141 CONG. REC.
S3,314 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995).  Professors McGinnis and Rappaport have observed that
“[t]he amendment effectively lost by only one vote because Senator Robert Dole voted
against it as a parliamentary maneuver to preserve his ability to bring the amendment
forward for reconsideration.”  McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 96, at 371 n.21 (citing 141 R
CONG. REC. S3,314 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995)).
In addition, Congress recently considered an amendment to require a two-thirds vote
to raise taxes. The House defeated this proposed amendment by a vote of 233 to 199 in
favor of adoption. See 143 CONG. REC. H1,491, H1,506 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1997).
98 See Baker & Dinkin, The Senate, supra note 11, at 71 tbl.5. R
\\Server03\productn\C\CHP\4-1\CHP106.txt unknown Seq: 32 23-APR-01 17:19
226 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 4:195
consent of two-thirds of the Senate (or a convention called by two-
thirds of the state legislatures) is necessary even to propose an
amendment, and ratification by three-fourths of the states is re-
quired for adoption.99  Thus, if the senators (or legislatures) from
as few as seventeen of these thirty-two over-represented states op-
posed the proposal of an amendment, or as few as thirteen states
opposed ratification, the continuation of the existing regime would
be ensured.
In order for an amendment limiting Congress’s spending
power to have any chance at adoption, therefore, its proponents
would need to persuade a substantial number of the states that
clearly benefit from the existing regime that they would do even
better under the proposed regime.  This would require the amend-
ment’s proponents to demonstrate not only that aggregate social
welfare would increase if the amendment were adopted, but also
that at least twenty of the thirty-two states that disproportion-
ately benefit from the existing regime would each experience an
increase in aggregate welfare notwithstanding the anticipated
loss of federal redistribution in their favor.  Moreover, to the ex-
tent that particular interest groups might have disproportionately
great power within particular states (e.g., farmers in Iowa and Ne-
braska, the dairy industry in Wisconsin), the amendment’s propo-
nents similarly would need to persuade these interest groups that
they would each experience an increase in aggregate welfare not-
withstanding the anticipated loss of federal redistribution in their
favor if the amendment were adopted.  I am far from sanguine
that proponents of such an amendment could provide the relevant
states and interest groups persuasive evidence on this score.
III. WHY HAS THE MODERN COURT DECLINED TO PLAY A ROLE?
The Framers did not intend for Congress’s spending power to
be unlimited and, as we have seen above, imposing the proper con-
straint on the spending power will increase aggregate social wel-
fare in any case.  The analysis in Part II makes clear that neither
the protections of the federal political process nor the constitu-
tional amendment process is likely to yield effective limits on the
congressional spending power.  And one is left to conclude that the
only meaningful solution lies in judicial review under the existing
Spending Clause.
In this regard, the Court could simply consider justiciable the
“general Welfare” limitation in the text of the Spending Clause,
and could invalidate any challenged spending legislation that it
concluded did not “provide for the common Defence and general
99 U.S. CONST. art. V.
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Welfare of the United States.”100  Since 1936, however, the Court
has proclaimed, increasingly emphatically, that it does not believe
it can or should undertake this task,101 and that “[i]t is for Con-
gress to decide which expenditures will promote the general
welfare.”102
Thus, the interesting question becomes why the Court has
taken this position.  The question merits discussion not only as an
academic matter, but also because understanding the Court’s view
is a necessary step in persuading the Court that it should change
it.  Three possibilities seem especially worthy of further considera-
tion:  (1) that the Court’s unwillingness to constrain Congress’s
power in this area is simply a vestige of the New Deal era that has
outlived any arguable usefulness; (2) that the Court believes that
the exercise of the spending power is better left to the politically
accountable branches of the federal government; or (3) that the
federal appropriations process does not readily lend itself to tradi-
tional judicial review.
It is possible that the Court’s unwillingness to review Con-
gress’s spending decisions continues today largely as a matter of
unfortunate habit formed during the New Deal era.103  To the ex-
tent that a major reason for constraining the spending power is to
protect state autonomy, the latter was the very antithesis of the
New Deal agenda.104  Having set out down the road of nonjusticia-
bility, the Court today may simply find this the path of least resis-
tance (or, at least, the path of least work).  Of course, the same
might have been said of the Court’s treatment of the commerce
power prior to Lopez.105  The spending power seems no less worthy
of re-examination by the Rehnquist Court.  And one might there-
fore hope that the current Court will soon undertake this task or,
at least, explain why it believes the spending power is different.
A second possibility is that the Court simply believes that the
exercise of the spending power is best left solely to the politically
accountable branches of the federal government.  If the voter-tax-
payer is unhappy with Congress’s spending decisions she can sim-
100 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
101 See supra notes 8-9. R
102 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976) (per curiam).
103 See, e.g., WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 154 (1995) (the Roosevelt Court “expanded
the commerce power and the taxing and spending power so greatly that it soon became
evident that there was almost no statute for social welfare or the regulation of business
that the Court would not invalidate”); Epstein, supra note 10 at 1. R
104 See, e.g., LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 103; WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL: 1932-1940 (1963); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW
DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998).
105 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Lopez was the first case in nearly sixty
years in which the Supreme Court held that a federal law exceeded Congress’s power under
the Commerce Clause. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309 (1936); Baker,
Conditional Federal Spending, supra note 1, at 1911. R
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ply “vote the bums out.”  As the discussion in Part I above showed,
however, political accountability does not play the role one might
hope in increasing aggregate social welfare under the spending
clause.  On election day, each voter faces a prisoner’s dilemma in
which the individually rational strategy is not to vote out one’s
representatives if they are successful in obtaining rent-seeking
legislation that benefits their home district and constituents, but
rather to vote them out if they do not obtain such legislation.
Such legislation, unfortunately, is highly likely to be aggregate-
welfare reducing.  Thus, political “accountability” in this context
has the utterly perverse effect of exacerbating the problem rather
than mitigating it.  It is precisely because the Court is not politi-
cally accountable in the same way that it alone can stop the other-
wise inevitable “race to the bottom.”106  Why, then, does the Court
refuse to seize this uniquely important opportunity?
A third possibility is that the Court considers judicial review
of Congress’s spending decisions to be unworkable because of the
nature of the federal appropriations process.  It is undoubtedly
true that the special nature and importance of appropriations leg-
islation raises a host of unique issues.107  For example, should a
lawsuit be limited to challenging a single “line item” of an appro-
priations bill?  What should the status of the challenged appropri-
ation be while the challenge proceeds through the courts?  And
should such challenges be heard on an expedited basis?
The fact that judicial review of such legislation raises unique
and possibly difficult issues, however, would not seem alone to be
a legitimate reason for the courts to abrogate their constitutional
duty.  In permitting taxpayers to have standing to challenge con-
gressional expenditures as violations of the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment, the Court in Flast v. Cohen was unper-
turbed by such practical concerns:  “we feel confident that the
questions will be framed with the necessary specificity, that the
issues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and that
the litigation will be pursued with the necessary vigor to assure
that the constitutional challenge will be made in a form tradition-
ally thought to be capable of judicial resolution.”108  In addition,
one wonders whether critics of judicial review in the spending con-
106 See supra note 19. R
107 See, e.g., ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS: POLITICS, POLICY, AND PRO-
CESS (1980); D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATTHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION:
CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS (1991); LANCE T. LELOUP, THE
FISCAL CONGRESS: LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF THE BUDGET (1980); DONALD F. KETTL, DEFICIT
POLITICS: PUBLIC BUDGETING IN ITS INSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT (1992).
108 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968) (distinguishing Frothingham as a case in
which “a taxpayer seeks to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized
grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal Sys-
tem”) (emphasis added).
\\Server03\productn\C\CHP\4-1\CHP106.txt unknown Seq: 35 23-APR-01 17:19
2001] Federalist Revival 229
text would as readily embrace a declaration by the Court that the
“free speech” clause of the First Amendment will henceforth be
nonjusticiable because of the difficult and novel practical and ju-
risprudential issues posed by the Internet and cyberspace.109
Finally, it is significant that in recent decades the federal
courts have been willing to take on enormously complex institu-
tional reform litigation ranging from school desegregation to
prison overcrowding.110  The role of the courts in these cases has
been at least as innovative and potentially rife with practical diffi-
culties as those likely to be encountered in judicial review of fed-
eral spending legislation.  All of this suggests that the issue
ultimately may be the Court’s willingness, rather than ability, to
limit Congress’s spending power.
CONCLUSION
Since 1936, the Supreme Court has increasingly emphatically
declared that it considers nonjusticiable any limitation on con-
gressional power that the Spending Clause may contain.  During
this same period, federal spending has undergone a transforma-
tion “from a modest budget devoted to public interest goods into a
vast engine for the production of private interest goods.”111  Com-
mentators and members of Congress alike have decried “the rise
and rise” of the special interest state,112 yet the rise continues
unabated.
In this Article, I have sought to explain both the mechanism
that powers the special interest state to the detriment of state au-
tonomy and why neither the protections of the federal political
process nor the constitutional amendment process is today likely
to yield effective limits on the congressional spending power.  This
analysis leads to the inescapable conclusion that the only mean-
109 For a more extensive discussion of the “double standard” of judicial review in the
context of federalism, see Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double
Standard of Judicial Review, __ DUKE L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2001); see also United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The substantial element of political
judgment in Commerce Clause matters leaves our institutional capacity to intervene more
in doubt than when we decide cases, for instance, under the Bill of Rights even though clear
and bright lines are often absent in the latter class of disputes. . . .  But our cases do not
teach that we have no role at all in determining the meaning of the Commerce Clause.”).
110 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 377 (1982) (discuss-
ing “structural reform” litigation “in which federal judges have assumed a new role” and
“actively supervise the implementation of a wide range of remedies designed to desegregate
schools and to reform prisons and other institutions”); see also, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (authorizing district court to achieve desegre-
gation through the use of quotas, redrawing of attendance zones, optional majority-to-mi-
nority school transfers, and busing); cases cited in Resnik, supra, at 386 n.56.
111 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 96, at 368. R
112 Cf. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231 (1994). See also generally McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 97.  For recent congres-
sional proposals, see supra note 97. R
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ingful solution lies in judicial review under the existing Spending
Clause, yet the modern Court has aggressively resisted playing
any role in this area.  I have speculated on three plausible reasons
for the Court’s reluctance to enforce the Constitution’s limits on
Congress’s spending power, and have found none to be especially
persuasive.
Perhaps, then, the Court simply has not appreciated either
the threat posed to state autonomy by an unfettered congressional
spending power or the uniquely beneficial role that judicial review
might play in this area.  If so, then by enlightening the Court this
Article may also, and more importantly, rouse it to action.
